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Abstract 
Unpacking and reconstituting different aspects of the Japanese narrative on China 
within the context of the Yasukuni controversy between 2001 and 2006, this 
thesis concludes that the constitution of China is an inherent part of the 
negotiating processes of the “Japanese we”. With a methodological framework 
comprised of grounded theory and narrative analysis; in its merged form referred 
to as grounded narratology, a theoretical framework derived from the constitution 
of “threat”, “dependence” and “shame” dimensions of the narrative is put 
together. The theoretical framework is constituted by theories of identity, security, 
ontological security, routinisation and banal nationalism. 
This thesis contributes empirically though presenting a material that the 
author has not seen utilised to this date. Methodologically, it contributes with the 
fusion of grounded theory and narrative analysis and theoretically through 
merging fragments of different theories into a network that suggests further 
research to be done on routinised nationalist security relations, a dynamic that the 
author argues is crucial to understanding the current developments of the 
Japanese image of China as well as Northeast Asian dynamics as a whole. 
 
Keywords: grounded theory, narrative analysis, Diet records, Japanese national 
identity, routinised nationalism 
 
  3 
Table of contents 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................................ 2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................................................................................... 3 
1 INTRODUCTION: THE THESIS..................................................................................................................... 5 
1.1 ANALYTICAL ASPECTS.................................................................................................................................... 6 
1.2 DELIMITATIONS .............................................................................................................................................. 6 
1.3 METHODOLOGY AND MATERIAL..................................................................................................................... 7 
1.4 PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS ............................................................................................................. 7 
1.5 THESIS OUTLINE ............................................................................................................................................. 8 
2 SETTING THE STAGE: THESIS BACKGROUND .................................................................................... 10 
2.1 NORTHEAST ASIA: CURRENT COMPLEXITIES ................................................................................................ 10 
2.2 SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS.......................................................................................................................... 11 
2.2.2 Issues at stake ...................................................................................................................................... 11 
2.3 THE YASUKUNI CONTROVERSY .................................................................................................................... 12 
2.3.1 Yasukuni in Northeast Asian politics ................................................................................................... 12 
2.3.2 Yasukuni in Sino-Japanese relations ................................................................................................... 12 
2.4 “COLD WAR” POLITICS................................................................................................................................. 13 
2.5 OFFICIAL RHETORICS OF IMPROVEMENT....................................................................................................... 13 
3 METHODOLOGY: GROUNDED NARRATOLOGY ................................................................................. 15 
3.1 GROUNDED THEORY ..................................................................................................................................... 15 
3.1.1 Coding.................................................................................................................................................. 16 
3.1.2 Constant comparison ........................................................................................................................... 16 
3.1.3 Narrativity to our rescue...................................................................................................................... 16 
3.2 NARRATIVE ANALYSIS.................................................................................................................................. 17 
3.2.1 Retelling the story ................................................................................................................................ 17 
3.3 THE MERGER – PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES.............................................................................................. 18 
4 THE YASUKUNI CONTROVERSY .............................................................................................................. 19 
4.1 IDENTIFICATIONS ATTACHED........................................................................................................................ 20 
4.1.1 Rightist identifications ......................................................................................................................... 20 
4.1.2 Leftist identifications............................................................................................................................ 20 
4.1.3 Domestically in China ......................................................................................................................... 21 
4.2 POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE ............................................................................................................................. 21 
5 RECONSTITUTING THE NARRATIVE...................................................................................................... 22 
5.1 THE “CHINA THREAT” .................................................................................................................................. 22 
5.1.1 Comparison.......................................................................................................................................... 23 
5.1.2 The bigger picture................................................................................................................................ 23 
5.1.3 Koizumi ................................................................................................................................................ 23 
5.1.4 Difference............................................................................................................................................. 24 
5.1.5 The masses feeling threatened ............................................................................................................. 24 
5.2 DEPENDENCE................................................................................................................................................ 24 
5.3 SHAME.......................................................................................................................................................... 25 
6 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................................... 26 
6.1 COMPILING THE NETWORK ........................................................................................................................... 26 
6.1.1 Identity ................................................................................................................................................. 26 
  4 
6.1.2 Security ................................................................................................................................................ 27 
6.1.3 Ontological security............................................................................................................................. 27 
6.1.4 The routinisation of security relations................................................................................................. 28 
6.1.5 Banal nationalism ................................................................................................................................ 28 
7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................ 29 
7.1 SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................................... 29 
7.2 CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................................. 29 
8 PRIMARY SOURCES...................................................................................................................................... 31 
9 SECONDARY SOURCES................................................................................................................................ 34 
 
  5 
1 Introduction: the thesis 
This thesis in its widest sense belongs to the intersection of identity studies and 
Japanese studies. It examines the way in which Japanese national identity is 
constituted in relation to it perception of China, defined as the negotiation of the 
Japanese narrative on China. Since they are many competing outlooks of what 
should be defined as the “Japanese” and the “Chinese” and there is no way to 
define one fixed category respectively including all these, what I perceive as the 
Japanese and the Chinese throughout the study, is my interpretation of the 
reconstitution of Japanese identity in relation to China that I have made based on a 
total of 284 contributions to debates in the Diet and its committes derived on the 
basis of the keywords “Yasukuni”, “China” and “2001-2006”. Yasukuni referrs to 
the Yasukuni controversy, one of the most contested issues facing Japan and 
China today. The reason for chosing a controversy, is that I assume conflictual 
behaviour to be more polarising tht that ofnon-conflictual settings, providing me 
with clear examples of the dynamics in play. This is merely an assumption, 
though. Since i only have this material to refer to, I have nothing to back up that 
statement. “China” was chosen for Japan to relate to. Identity theory identifies the 
need for elements to relate to as not belonging to the self (Campbell 1992:50) in 
order to organise one’s perceptions of the self (Kinnvall 2004:746), either on the 
individual level or as a state (Steele 2005:519f). Routinising these relationships, 
as we will later see in the outline of the case, becomes an attachment (Mitzen 
2006:341) based on an assured sense of security derived from the knowing 
(McSweeney 1999:13-15, 17f ) of how to define China and precisely here lays the 
motivation to a study of the “Japanese” securitisation of “China”. As the alien 
other of the “Japanese” China appears for the first time in Kojiki, the first printed 
matter of Japan. Through the background of this history of alienation (that persists 
still today (Rozman 2008:217)). Given the thorough historical of these two 
countries (I will not go into this here. Let us just say that Japan has “imported” a 
large part of its cultural heritage from this country, through the Korean peninsula). 
The time period chosen, former prime minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi’s time in 
office, was given the case an obvious choice. Koizumi, as we shall later see, had a 
severe impact on its dynamics and it has never been as overtly contested as during 
his time in office. Other than Yasukuni, contested textbook history writings and 
Japan’s denial to accnowledge war-time prostitution (freqently referred to as the 
“Comfort women” case) are among the three more challenging today. 
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1.1 Analytical aspects 
The theoretical part of this paper consists of a conceptual framework outlining and 
relating the core concepts of the study. Based on the methodological framework 
comprised of grounded narratology; the fusion of the approaches of grounded 
theory and narrative analysis, the concepts are derived from the data analysis and 
the compiled into a framework for further analysis. Narrative, or narrativity, in 
this context, is defined as the drive to render experience cohesive and coherent 
(Patterson-Monroe 1998:328), and focuses on our quest to explain our being and 
acting in relation to the outside world (Somers-Gibson 1994:61f). Identity 
production is defined as the process that takes place between subjectivity and 
social knowledge (Kinnvall 2004:746), in this thesis, as already stated, defined as 
the negotiating process producing and reproducing Japanese national identity. 
Security, in this context, is defined as one such process of identity production 
based on the alienation of a chosen “other”, in this case China. Ontological 
security, or the security of being (ibid.), is the processes  of identity and security 
production in joint concert. Routinisation, the dimension in which these 
relationships are becoming dependent of each other, for example, in which 
Japanese and Chinese domestic policy become attached to the Yasukuni 
controversy in order to justify their own nationalist agendas (Rose 2007:24-25, 
45). Banal nationalism, providing an account of how these routinised 
relationships become incorporated into our every day lives, in addition also adds 
the dynamics of mass mobilisation. Since most identity is embedded in complex, 
multi-dimensional systems to make sense (Waever 2002:24), the analysis takes on 
a multi-layered character consisting of the unpacking and reconstitution of the 
interpretation of meaning in the Japanese narrative on China within the context of 
the Yasukuni controversy. 
1.2 Delimitations 
There are a few things that need to be said about the Japanese. What is today 
referred to as “Japanese” identity has, just like many other cases of national 
identity, not always been the same. There no doubt are competing versions of 
Japanese national identity even without including China in the picture. There are 
the groups with Ainu heritage, groups identifying themselves as Okinawans, 
groups of so called Nikkei immigrants, groups of women, as well as many others 
defining their particular sense of belonging to society somewhat different to what 
we shall see in this study, that are situated inside of what is referred to as the 
“Japanese” context. These unfortunately fall outside of the scope of this study. I 
say unfortunately, because this happens not because they are any less relevant. 
This happens only in order to make this study feasible at all within its limitations. 
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The national identity interpreted as the “Japanese” in this paper, is to be seen as 
produced by a small, hetero normative group of predominately males of 
respectable age, and, thus, has to be interpreted as such. Since vital groups are 
excluded, the narrative cannot be taken as evidence, but has to be interpreted as a 
limited representation merely illustrating the case. No generalisations in terms of 
some all-encompassing “Japaneseness” can thus be made on the basis of the 
material (Patterson-Monroe 1998:327). 
1.3 Methodology and material 
Entering “China” and “Yasukuni” into the Japanese government’s search engine 
for Diet protocols as well as delimiting the scope to 2001-2006, generates 284 
hits. Reading through these contributions, 138 are deemed irrelevant, mostly on 
the basis of their irrelevancy – either on the basis of them mere being referred to 
in relation to other topics, or because the key words are not interrelated. An 
additional five contributions are left out due to the failure to understand their 
intended messages. These exclusions leave us with 141 contributions distributed 
as follows: 20 remaining hits in 2001, 21 in 2002, 11 in 2003, 27 in 2004, 45 in 
2005, and 21 in 2006. The protocols vary in terms of length, content, depth, and 
creativity, and the numbers are not to be interpreted as interesting as such. 
After this initial stage, key words that are seen as symptomatic of the narrative are 
identified. The ones accounted for here, are the “China” threat, “dependency” and 
“shame”. The paradigms are then related to fragments of the theories 
accompanying the concepts of identity, security, ontological security, 
routinisation and banal nationalism as outlined above. Since this takes place in a 
dialectical process (Bryman 2001:283), the categories (concepts) are the result of 
constant changes. In order to secure the transparency of the study, many citations 
will be provided (Bergström-Boreus 2000:262) to illustrate the argument and to 
motivate the choices made (Bryman 2001:283). 
1.4 Purpose and research questions 
For the limited scope of a thesis like this, such a complex question as Sino-
Japanese relations is simply to large. A first delimitation is therefore to chose to 
only focus on the Japanese side; delimiting the study to only looking at the 
Japanese side or the Japanese way of looking at itself in relation to what is 
perceived as “foreign” embodied by China. By way of looking at the 
“foreignness” inherent to the “Japaneseness” I intend to unpack the Japanese 
sense of a “we” in order to see what lurks behind it. Since there is no Japanese 
way of looking at China, I have chosen to analyse what could be perceived as the 
“official” way of doing so. Selecting debates from the Japanese Diet based on the 
keywords “Yasukuni” and China and then sifting out those hits merely relating to 
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one of the two, the Japanese narrative on China within the context of the 
Yasukuni controversy is then identified and analysed. My empirical aim of this 
thesis is to reconstruct the Japanese narrative on China as articulated in these 
debates on this particular controversy. This is intesting and relevant since this 
material, stemming from what I know, not have been utilised to date. The 
unpacked narrative is then reconstructed in order to assign it with different 
meanings. The reconstructed narrative is then theoretisised and referred back to 
the context of Sino-Japanese relation where we first started. 
The questions guiding me are: 
How is “China” negotiated in Japanese Diet debates over the Yasukuni 
controversy between 2001 and 2006? 
 
How can the study of this narrative benefit from a fusion of grounded theory and 
narrative analysis? 
 
Which are the theoretical elements needed for a theoretisation of the narrative? 
1.5 Thesis outline 
Having defined the problem of inquiry, stated the purpose as well as narrowed it 
down to three specific research questions, the next step is to structure the outline 
of the study in order to explain how it has been structured as well as what parts 
are related in which ways; what is derived from what. After this first introductory 
chapter introducing the study, declaring its purpose and research questions as well 
as to providing an outline of it, the next chapter, historising the regionalism of 
Northeast Asia, discussing its implications for Sino-Japanese relations as well as 
to briefly outlining our case at hand; the Yasukuni controversy, is aimed at 
situating the study in its proper context. Chapter three then provides us with the 
methodological framework, consisting of a fusion of the grounded theory 
approach and narrative analysis. This provides us with an outline of the 
methodological procedures of the study. Chapter four is an outline of the 
Yasukuni controversy, complemented with a discussion of the identities attached 
to it. This chapter also provides us with an account of the political significance of 
the controversy. Thereafter, in chapter five, follows the reconstruction of three 
selected aspects of the narrative that I have chosen to reconstruct in order to 
illuminate both the research process and the narrative as such. These aspects are 
the “China threat”, “dependency” (as referred to Japan’s perceived dependency of 
China) and “shame” (defined as the negotiation process of whther Japan should 
take upon itself feelings of guilt after its deeds in the Second World War). Chapter 
six then proceeds with the theoretical analysis of the reconstruction. In chapter 
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seven, the study is summed up and the conclusions are presented. Chapter eight 
provides and outline of the primary sources used in this study together with some 
comments of these. Chapter nine, lastly, lists the  secondary sources. 
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2 Setting the stage: thesis background 
Beginning the study by locating it in its proper context of Northeast Asia, it is in 
place to account for the current state of affairs of this politically intriguing region. 
Thereafter, delimiting the scope of the study, follows an outline of some of the 
current issues facing Sino-Japanese relations. Accounting for the challenges to 
Northeast Asia, embodied in the complexities of its emergent events, I will, 
before we proceed to the matters of this thesis as such, introduce two such aspects 
that I wish to study. 
2.1 Northeast Asia: current complexities 
Northeast Asia is a region clouded by multiple contradicting images of security 
excesses as well as persistent misperceptions of intentions and capabilities. This 
makes it a site where security tensions and national identity clashes are intense 
(Rozman 2007:200). Disregarding the alarming matters between the two Koreas 
as well as domestic outbursts of violence in China, there are still plenty of 
contested wounds yet to be healed in this region. One such issue is the history 
writings of school textbooks, in which a settlement on common ground in terms of 
how history should be written yet is to come. Another one is Japan’s denial of the 
involvement in war-time prostitution, an issue often referred to as the “Comfort 
women” case that is provoking much criticism among Japan’s neighbours. 
Moreover, Japan is also denying to compensate for forced labour, another of its 
remnants from the Pacific War (the part of the Second World War that was staged 
in Asia). Together with repeated attempts to justify this war as well as its colonial 
period (in which Japan colonised Korea) all put serious strains on Japan’s 
relations with its most important neighbours: the People’s Republic of China and 
the Republic of Korea. In the relations between Japan and China, issues regarding 
the Sino-Japanese War/ the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance are especially 
sensitive. In Japan-Korea relations the Japanese colonial period is the most 
contested. (Schneider 2008:107-115). 
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2.2 Sino-Japanese relations 
With Japan’s “normalisation process” towards establishing regular military forces 
of its own and the simultaneous rise of China, the bilateral relations of these two 
countries are becoming increasingly strained. 
2.2.1 Current developments 
US-China and US-Japan relations are sometimes referred to as the two most 
important bilateral relationships of the world today. In their shadows, Japan-China 
relations are only seldomly appraised significant. They are not even mentioned as 
important for either China or Japan. Presently, Chinese-Japanese relations can 
easily be said to be at their worst since the end of World War II and demonising 
campaigns are working their ways in both Japan and China. These campaigns 
frequently have the unintended consequence of strengthening nationalism. In 
Japan one of five leading newspapers as well as an array of of magazines 
regularly fuel Chinese popular nationalist sentiment. In a similar manner, recent, 
quasi-official media campaigns in China with the purpose of demonising Japan, 
are working well to mobilize to anti-Japanese manifestations among the Chinese 
with resulting destruction of Japanese property and so forth. Additionally, it also 
serves the Japanese nationalist cause, feeding the propaganda machines with even 
more reasons for their cause (Cooney 2007:151, Rose 2005:40, 43). Not long 
after Koizumi’s inauguration as prime minister, bilateral meetings between China 
and Japan were discontinued and so it remained for the remainder of his time in 
office (Rose 2005:45). Koizumi is sometimes accused of having provoked a “Cold 
War” between the two through his regular pilgrimages to the site (Hagström 
2008/09:224). 
2.2.2 Issues at stake 
The major issues facing these two powers today, are the ones of divergent history 
writings, territorial disputes and the controversial Japanese prime ministerial visits 
to the Yasukuni shrine (Rose 2005:45). Trapped in a mutual siege of excluding 
nationalisms for domestic consumption (Schneider 2008:107-115), nationalist 
agendas are fed from these intrigues. In order to take a deeper look at the 
dynamics underlying such viscious circles, we shall in this thesis further examine 
the Yasukuni controversy. 
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2.3 The Yasukuni controversy 
The Yasukuni issue is one of those that has been especially prolonged and 
notorious, and that has contributed to both reinforcements and reconsiderations of 
the foreign affairs of the region. Constituting one of the most politically relevant 
history problems currently troubling Northeast Asia, its prime ministerial visits 
have generated much conflict. The Yasukuni controversy is essentially constituted 
of a clash between advocates of Japan’s inability to assume responsibility for war-
time atrocities (such as the ones outlined earlier), on the one hand, and proponents 
of the non-interference of other nations statement proclaiming Yasukuni to be a 
domestic matter on the other.  
2.3.1 Yasukuni in Northeast Asian politics 
The Yasukuni issue, further, represents a prism of the changes in Northeast Asia 
over the past two decades, attesting to altered distributions of power, changing 
state-society relations, heightened significance of the past for the present as well 
as prevailing national self-images. The variety of symbolisms of Yasukuni 
additionally serve as one of the most important arenas where the past, as well as 
contested images of the countries’ selves and others are produced and reproduced. 
As the promotion of patriotism, defined as pride in one’s country, remains a 
central goal in the national policies of all the four countries of this region, a 
resolution to these issues is likely to necessitate serious commitment from all the 
parties involved. This since these countries this far have shown proof to, rather 
than accounting for the actual complexities at hand, all prioritize the objectives of 
fostering national self-respect and unity.  
2.3.2 Yasukuni in Sino-Japanese relations 
The Yasukuni controversy, emerging domestically at the end of the American 
Occupation of Japan following upon the Second World War, has ever since been 
an ongoing dispute. Receiving status as a diplomatic issue between Japan and its 
neighbours, particularly China and South Korea, with former prime minister 
Yasuhiro Nakasone’s visit in 1985, it is by its neighbours often viewed as 
centrally located at the very heart of the debate about Japan’s war responsibility 
and its perceived inability to reconcile with Asia (Rose 2007:24-25, 45). 
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2.4 “Cold War” politics 
Koizumi’s ascent to power in April 2001 reproduced what by some have been 
called a “Cold War” in Sino-Japanese relations with bilateral summits cancelled 
between October 2001 and September 2006, ending with Koizumi’s descending. 
With Japan’s economic decline, China’s economic rise, his annual pilgrimages to 
the Yasukuni shrine and Aso deciding to publicly depict China a threat to Japan’s 
security, the relation reached an all-time low in 2005. Opinion polls conducted by 
the Japanese Cabinet Office in that year show that some 63.4 per cent of the 
surveyed Japanese expressed that they had no feelings of affinity with China. 
Compared to a similar poll from 1980 this represents an increase of almost 50 per 
cent. At the same time, 71.2 per cent believed the bilateral relationship between 
the two countries to be “not good”. In a similar survey in december 2008, after 
two years of supposed reconciliation after Koizumi’s descent, the “no sense of 
affinity” had increased to 66.6 per cent and the “not good relationship” to 71.9 per 
cent (Hagström 2009:223, 234). 
 
2.5 Official rhetorics of improvement 
 
What is striking with these developments is not so much that the two are going in 
different directions, making the dynamics increasingly polarised. More so, is the 
fact that Sino-Japanese relations since September 2006 and up until today 
officially have improved drastically. The earlier rhetorics of tension have all of a 
suddenly been transformed into positive statements about cooperation and well-
being and both governments are believed to be likely to do their outmost to 
maintain this illusion (ibid.:237). As an example, Aso, in addressing the economic 
crisis in a speech to a group of future Asian leaders in April 2009, prompted it to 
be “absolutely critical that Japan and China, the second- and third-largest 
economies in the world with major responsibilities regarding the world economy” 
“move in coordination with each other” (Aso 2009). Commenting on the 
economic growth of Asia he goes on to state that Japan and China “are in a 
position to lead the Asian economy” and that there further is “a major premise in 
working to achieve that” (ibid.).  
 
2.6 Currents of nationalism 
 
At the same time, Japanese Diet members openly depict China Japan’s biggest 
enemy and many policy makers view China as a threat. Public opinion against 
China has for a long time succeeded through nationalist politicians and journalists 
in large-circulation newspapers and journals as well as elsewhere. With as many 
as ten per cent of the Japanese ruling party considered part of a nationalist group 
in 2007 (Hagström 2009:237), these efforts have not been fruitless. 
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2.5 The “China threat” 
At the above mentioned news conference in Tokyo in December 2005 the then 
foreign minister and current prime minister of Japan, Taro Aso, said: China, a 
“neighbor with one billion people equipped with nuclear bombs,” is begining to 
pose a “considerable threat” (Takahara 2005). Meanwhile, Hu Jintao, currently 
the Paramount Leader of the People’s republic of China, in the same year 
denominated the Yasukuni issue to be the single problem preventing China and 
Japan to move ahead. On the part of Japan, China’s military expansion has been 
the focus of much criticism and anxiety (Aso 2009). In 2006 Li Changchun of the 
Politburo went as far as to state that these represented the most serious difficulties 
since the normalization of diplomatic ties between the countries (Rose 2007:23) 
in 1972. 
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3 Methodology: grounded narratology 
In order to unpack the Japanese narrative on China, a methodological framework 
consisting of a fusion of the two approaches of grounded theory and narrative 
analysis is here to be presented and discussed. I say approaches, since both of 
these are frequently referred to as such by their proponents. By approach, I mean 
that they are more than just any methodologies in the sense that they both to an 
extent turn the research process “up-side-down”. We shall soon see what I mean. 
Grounded theory, is an approach to the generation of theory. Inducively deriving 
keywords from empirical data that, in a second step, are coded, categorised and 
analysed, it serves to bridge the gap between pompous theory and ordinary-life 
data (Alvesson – Sköldberg 1994:69). This, I argue, is particularly useful and 
enabling for a study aiming at a cultural context far away from that in which most 
theory has traditionally been developed. Narrative theory, or narratology; the 
study of narratives, or stories, is an approach to the study of our every-day telling 
and retelling of the stories; the meaning making processes through which we 
make sense of ourselves and our lives (Bryman 2001:401, Robertson 2005:223, 
227, Somers 1994:613-617). Based on the notion that we, human beings, are 
story-telling creatures, narration is appreciated to be the most fundamental in 
human communication (Dahlgren 2000:95, Robertson 2005:220-221). Common 
to both grounded theory and narrative analysis, is that the role of the researcher 
takes on the character of a narrator (Heide 2000:68). 
3.1 Grounded theory 
Grounded theory is stated by Bryman to be the by far most widely utilised 
framework for analysing qualitative data. Its core lays is the process of deriving 
theory from data. This data is then systematically gathered and analysed 
throughout the research process. In grounded theory, the collection of data, 
analysis and theories stand in close relationship to each other (2001:390). Since 
the theory is derived from the data and not the other way around, as may at other 
times be the case, the theoretical part of this thesis is, accordingly, found closer to 
the end than what may otherwise be expected. Data collection and analysis has 
throughout this whole study proceeded in tandem, that is, repeatedly referring 
back to each other (ibid.). The grounded theory approach provides different tools 
of analysis. In order to structure the outline of how this study has proceeded, I 
will describe these individually, theoretically as well as referring to the study. 
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3.1.1 Coding 
Coding is the key process of grounded theory. It is here the data is broken down 
into components, given names and categorised (Bryman 2001:391). In this thesis, 
the primary material consists of 284 contriubutions to Japanese parliamentary 
debates derived through inserting the key words “Yasukuni”, “China” and “2001-
2006” into the official Japanese Diet record search engine. Reading through these 
284 hits, keywords were derived and grouped into categories reflecting different 
aspects of the narrative as a whole. In the empirical account three such categories 
are presented and analysed; namely: the perception of a China threat, Japan’s 
dependence on China and its feelings of shame. These categories emerged based 
on my interpretation of the data and makes me an inherent part of the research 
process. 
3.1.2 Constant comparison 
Constant comparison is the process of maintaining a close connection between the 
data and its conceptualisation. This is to guarantee that the correspondence 
between the data and the conceptualisation is not lost. It also entails the constant 
comparison of phenomena coded under a certain category to facilitate the 
emergence of the theoretical elaboration. Thirdly, the constant comparison also 
entails being sensitive to contrasts between the categories that are emerging in 
order to keep their relations to other categories clear (ibid.). this aspect of 
grounded theory has influenced the study in the sense that I have worked by 
stages. This means that I have been careful to oscillate between the categorising 
work and the compilation of theories for the analysis thereof. 
3.1.3 Narrativity to our rescue 
The biggest risk usually associated with grounded theory, is the possible problem 
of losing the context of what is said. Further, plucking chunks of data out of the 
context in which they originally appeared, may result in fragmenting the data, 
losing the narrative flow of the story told (ibid.: 400-402). This is precisely where 
the second part of this methodological framework; that of narrative analysis, 
comes in. Narrative analysis complements the grounded theory approach with the 
reconstruction of the narrative flow. Grounded theoryin turn, provides narrative 
analysis with the significance that it gains through the theoretisation of the 
reconstructed narrative (ibid.:402). This widens the opportunities of narrative 
analysis to link its findings to wider social contexts than the purely local subject 
studied. Narrative analysis is frequently criticised for being “too subjective” and 
this is what we avoid by combining it with grounded theory. 
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3.2 Narrative analysis 
Narrative analysis, as defined by Bryman, is an approach to the elicitation and 
analysis of data. This elicitation of data, essentially the reconstruction of the 
stories that people tell in order to make sense of themselves and their lives, is 
sensitive to temporality. By detecting and injecting temporal sequence to their 
understanding of life, people are able to produce accounts of what can be 
perceived as continuity, often understood as meaningfulness. Narrative analysis is 
thus about focusing on the answers that people provide to the for them crucial 
matters of their existence as stories. On the basis of these stories, the researcher 
then, depending on her or his focus, reconstructs what has been said into yet 
another story. Just like the original story relates episodes to each other and 
account for the interconnections between them, the story reconstructed by the 
researcher does as well. In focus of this reconstruction is the functions that the 
narrative serves for the teller (Bryman 2001:401). 
3.2.1 Retelling the story 
The retelling of the story, as staged by the researcher, has the purpose of retelling 
what is told, in a way that is different from what was originally the case. This in 
order to prove a different point. For example, in the original stories depicting 
China a threat, as we shall see in the outline of the narrative of the perception of a 
“China threat” later on, the original points are generally made either to approve or 
disapprove of the depiction of China as a threat. In this setting, the contributions 
as such are, and can only be interpreted as, merely individual contributions to the 
national debate. By extracting those fragments that discuss whether or not China 
should be depicted a threat, the possibility of systematising, or reconstructing, an 
alternative contextualisation that enables the study of underlying currents that are 
usually drowned in the surrounding information and thus remain invisible, I 
argue, is a prominent feature of narrative analysis. The validation criteria here lies 
in the fact that what is in essence studied, is the original point made in the original 
setting. In this case, what I am interested in, is, firstly, to inquire into the points 
made in the contributions. I want to know whether people argue pro or con the 
image of the China threat to Japan’s security. I also want to know how they 
motivate their standpoints. In the maintenance of the function of the teller 
throughout the reconstruction process lies the strength of this approach. This 
requires the researcher to be susceptible to her or his cultural context in order not 
to foresee matters that could further the analysis (Bryman 2001:401). This makes 
the role of the researcher utilising narrative analysis as much a part of the research 
process as the one preffering grounded theory. This element furthers the 
connection between the two and is one of the reasons that they so readibly can be 
merged into one framework, one that I have called grunded narratology. 
Grounded here stands for its close connection to empirical data, and narratology 
for its foundation of the narrated. 
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3.3 The merger – problems and possibilities 
Merging the two approaches together it is in place that I account for both their, 
and my own, metatheoretical assumptions. There is much variation in the fields of 
both grounded theory and narrative analysis. Grounded theory can, for example, 
be used for both qualitative and quantitative purposes. Even though I have thus far 
never encountered any accounts of such measures within the narrative tradition 
(and most likely will not find myself doing that either), there is still much 
variation within this field as well. My understandings and applications of 
grounded theory and narrative analysis have in common that they both belong to 
the interpretist school. As such, their emphasis are on the search for knowledge 
found in the contingent social processes in which the knowledge is produced 
(Marsh-Furlong 2002:18-21). The production of knowledge is thus defined as a 
social matter, and, as such, has to be studied through social interaction. With their 
relational, social constructionist ontology and hermeneutic epistemology 
(2002:136), these two approaches are meta-theoretically compatible. This means 
that they have the same common ground and can, from that point of view, be 
merged together. 
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4 The Yasukuni controversy 
The Yasukuni shrine, founded by the Japanese government in the Meiji period for 
the worship of the divine spirits who sacrificed their lives for the country. Its 
religious purpose was to pacify the spirits of the war dead to prevent them from 
seeking retribution on the living. As the Meiji government turned Shinto into the 
official religion of the Japanese state, Yasukuni became the central site for 
commemoration and worship of divine spirits. The way of becoming a divine 
spirit is to fight in the name of the Japanese emperor and nation. Beginning in 
1853 the spirits of approcimately 2.5 million war dead have been inshrined at 
Yasukuni and the shrine receives approximately eight million visitors a year. It is 
considered a central site for national memory in Japan. As a symbol of pre-war 
state Shinto and Japanese militarism, it divides the Japanese nation, going to the 
core of contested interpretations of Japan’s role in the Second World War and the 
recreation of a national identity in the post-was period. Crudely put, the Yasukuni 
controversy is staged between leftist progressives who view Japan’s actions 
during the Second World War as aggressive and are in favour of a strict 
separation between the state and religion. On the other hand those on the right 
view Japan’s role in the Second World War as part of the struggle against colonial 
domination of Asia and are in favour of state support for the Yasukuni shrine 
(Rose 2007:25-26). In China Yasukuni shrine symbolises Japan’s neglection of 
war-time guilt and refusal to deal with the issue of divergent history writings 
facing Northeast Asia properly. There is much criticism against prime ministerial 
visits to the shrine mainly based on the enshrinement of 14 A-classed war 
criminals that were secretly enshrined at Yasukuni in 1978. yasukuni provokes 
controversy because of its association with a particular interpretation of the past. 
National historical memory; the way in which a nation remembers its past, is 
central to the formulation and reformulation of national identity. As we have seen, 
there is an ongoing struggle domestically in Japan between the left and the right 
over the mastery of the national identity narrative. The symbolism of the 
Yasukunis hrine, in addition to the version of history presented in its history 
museum, embodies the affirmative view of Japan’s role in teh Second World War, 
that of Japan as a liberator, rather than an aggressor. Yasukuni shrine and the 
Yushukan, its history museum, have come to play a central role in the political, 
religious and cultural affirmation and reaffirmation fo the nation. Given the 
enshrinement of the war criminals, many people have come to wonder what it 
really is that the prime ministers are there to honour (ibid.:27-29). 
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4.1 Identifications attached 
Chinese people officially identify with their history as victims of Japan’s 
imperialist drives and the Yasukuni shrine thus evokes a very negative memory in 
contemporary China. Recalling Japanese aggression and imperial conquest as well 
as past suffering caused by Japanese invasions and occupation, the controversy 
has strengthened popular resistance to the shrine. It has also been suggested by 
som scholars that China’s nationalist identity was formed in part by its struggle 
against Japanese invaders. China’s firm opposition to Japanese prime ministerial 
visits to the shrine usually provokes expressions and concerns and displeasure as 
well as serious political protests and sometimes street demontrations as well 
(Shibuichi 2005:204-5). 
4.1.1 Rightist identifications 
Domestically in Japan, Japanese rightists, identifying with the pre-war Japanese 
state, in general tend to glorify Japan’s past imperialist expansion. Perceiving 
Yasukuni shrine as a heartwarming symbol of self-sacrifice and patriotism and 
maintaining that ordinary Japanese should never forget the sacrifice of the fallen 
heroes equated with the history of modern Japan and the hardships it endured; 
Yasukuni functions as a reassurement of the continuity of Japanese tradition, 
religion and culture. Considering Japan’s historical identity as a modern nation 
state to be at stake, any concessions to their opponents are likely to be seen as 
tantamount to admitting that Japanese history of the mid-19th to mid-20th centuries 
to be a mistake (ibid.:199) and thus that it compromises Japan of today. Some also 
fear that an admission of guilt for past transgressions would turn their erstwhile 
fathers and brothers into war criminals (Tamamoto 2001:35). 
4.1.2 Leftist identifications 
Many leftists, believing to represent the progressive force in the dispute, maintain 
the shrine to be a symbol of cruel militarism. Stating that the continuing existence 
of Yasukuni shrine proves that militarism and feudalism survive in contemporary 
Japanese society and that prime ministerial visits breach the separation of state 
and religion clause of the so called peace constitution, stating that the Japanese 
state and nation should be predicated on the 1945 war defeat and its aftermath. 
Believing that Japan was reborn when human rights, democracy and pacifism 
were introduced by the occupation forces makes Yasukuni a symbol of the Japan 
that died in August 1945. Rejecting any relationship to Japan’s identity, leftist 
generally symphatise with civilian causalties and are likely to form alliances with 
their Chinese counterparts in order to prove their point (Schibuichi 2005:203f). 
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4.1.3 Domestically in China 
Domestically in China, just like in Japan, the new post-war generation of leaders 
sometimes find it politically expedient to recall the country’s past traumas. 
Chinese leaders are thereby also translating communicative memory into 
permanent cultural memory. This has had the implications of official depictions of 
Sino-Japanese relations being changed to fit whichever agenda suitable and have 
thus diverged considerably over the past half century (Rose 2007:43-44). Just like 
in Japan’s case, as we shall later see, this makes China attached to the dynamics 
of conflict embodied in the Yasukuni narrative. 
4.2 Political significance 
With each party holding an image of the shrine according with their own 
historical and personal identity, the symbolism of the shrine works as a catalyst 
for a clash of identities. Generating conflicting political and diplomatic pressure 
on Japanese prime ministers, this has stirred domestic anger and triggered 
numerous diplomatic disputes over the years, to visit or not to visit the shrine. 
Yasukuni is controversial because of these visits. Some see them as representative 
of the rise of Japanese jingoistic nationalism and militarism, pointing to the 
enshrinement of the war criminals. Others point to sentimentality and historical 
amnesia and yet others claim that Japan, on the basis of its post-war peace 
constitution would be incapable of belligerent nationalism. Much of the 
controversy has been over the right – or lack thereof – for the Japanese to assert 
their historical identity. Importance has to be paid to the role of the rightists, on 
this matter more specifically to their most influential lobbying group, pushing 
leading politicians to visit the shrine. The visits by Nakasone and Koizumi are 
widely considered to be the most significant political and diplomatic collisions in 
the history of the Yasukuni shrine dispute. Nakasone because he was the first to 
announce his visit beforehand and Koizumi since he persisted with regular visits 
throughout his time in office (Shibuichi 2005:197f). Whereas Nakasone listened 
to his critics and only caused turbulence on this matter once, Koizumi persisted all 
throughout. 
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5 Reconstituting the narrative 
Having outlined the Yasukuni controversy as well as the identifications that are 
attached to it, our next step is to reconstruct a few aspects that have been singled 
out from the narrative. These are, in order: the “China threat”, “dependence” and 
“shame”. The so called “China threat” aspect is my reconstruction of the 
contributions to the debate apart from the keywords of “Yasukuni” and “China” 
also contain the word “threat”. Redoing the search, this time inserting 
“Yasukuni”, “China”, “threat” and “2001-2006” into the Japanese government 
search engine generates 42 hits. Out of these 23 are rendered irrelevant and one 
incomprehensible (I simply failed to interpret the intended point). This leaves us 
with 18 remaining hits. Reading through them once more and putting them 
together in chronological order after when they appeared, relating them in a way 
that a new, reconstructed, narrative was created. These contributions to the debate 
thus make up the basis upon which a reconstruction of one aspect of the wider 
Yasukuni narrative is set apart and shed light on. Someone by now may be 
wondering how on earth I could possibly take all these statements out of their 
proper contexts and then in whichever way convenes me put them back together 
again. I would say that there is slightly more to the analysis than that. I argue, that 
by the eminent feature of enabling the elucidating of certain features, grounded 
narratology, or narrative analysis, where it originally belongs, entails features that 
enable analyses that other approaches do not have. Taking into consideration that 
the researcher is an inherent part of the analysis, not agreeing with such an 
approach may just leave the critic better off searching for something suitable 
elsewhere. My purpose, anyhow, is to make this process as illicit as possible and 
my hopes are that this chapter will serve as an illustration of narratological 
methodology (the features of grounded theory are left for next chapter). No 
discrimination based on political affiliation or the like has been made except in 
one case: that of Koizumi, in which I have clearly stated the origin of the 
contribution. 
5.1 The “China threat” 
Referring to Taro Aso’s depiction of China a threat, this aspect of the narrative is 
certainly both interesting and relevant. The text is fairly long and the 
categorisations that I have divided it up into, are merely to easy up the read. 
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5.1.1 Comparison 
On May 28, 2001 it was stated in a contribution to the Diet debate that “China’s 
military strength, including nuclear weapons, is already far greater a threat to the 
peace and stability of Asia and the world than that of Japan” (130508). Even 
though this per se is a depiction of a threatening China, it is not related to Japan in 
any other sense than that of a comparison. On March 19, 2002, in a different 
debate, China’s military and economic threat was assessed to be “not quite a 
threat” since its weapons were estimated to be of poor quality and the country 
economically merely developing as the world’s factory floor. As such, it was 
stated, it was not to take as too serious of a threat (140319). Adding the economy 
as a dimension to the framework of threat, as well as diminishing China’s 
capacities, both militarily and economically, the superiority of Japan over China 
is here legibly assumed. On april 24 of the same year, the threat dimension 
derived from the Yasukuni controversy itself was depicted a threat to Asian 
diplomacy (140424). There are many different options to what the intentions of 
the speaker could be. What can be interpreted from the contribution, however, is 
that the controversy is taken as a serious matter influencing  Sino-Japanese 
relations. This view contrasts that of those claiming Yasukuni to be a domestic 
issue for other states not to interfere in. 
5.1.2 The bigger picture 
On June 5, 2003 it was stated that the peace and stability of Northeast Asia 
depend on the status of amity – or the lack thereof – between Japan and China. 
Appealing to the Diet to take on the perspective of the bigger picture of Northeast 
Asian peace and stability as a whole rather than just merely focusing on China’s 
perceived threat against Japan (150605), there is an emphasis on the importance 
that these two neighbours play for peace and stability in Northeast Asia as well as 
a sound plead to take a step back from what is perceived as imminent in order to 
gain a wider persepctive that can inform this narrower scope and place in its 
regional context. 
5.1.3 Koizumi 
Koizumi, on the Yasukuni controversy in its entirety, is consistent in his 
statements. On November 25, 2003 he states the developments in China, rather 
than being threatening, are to be regarded as opportune for Japan (151125). The 
following five pertaining statements, one of them by Koizumi, agree with this 
statement (160323, 161018, 161020, 161202, 170214). 
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5.1.4 Difference 
On February 16, 2005 difference, again, is emphasised towards China. This time 
its internal problems are the focus of the analysis (170216). February 23 the same 
year is seeing what I perceive as increased intensity in the debate. Arguing that 
China is growing increasingly powerful, conquers more and more ground and has 
a navy that poses a considerable threat. Further arguing that the rise of China has 
a considerable impact on Japan, the debater conveys that China, Japan and South 
Korea are in a position in which they need to define a balance in between them. 
Stating that this is serious and has to be analysed (170223), the debater seems 
worried about these developments. On October 20, 2005 someone wonders how 
far gone China’s weapons of nuclear destruction are (171020). On October 26 the 
same year our by now well-known statement that China’s growing economy gives 
rise to not a threat, but to opportunities appears again (171026). 
5.1.5 The masses feeling threatened 
A statement dated January 23 the following year goes from talking merely about 
Japan to also include its citizens that here are described as feeling threatened to a 
large extent (180123). On February 8 there was a speech about “the threat from 
China” (180208), on the 15 it was stated that the China threat was increasing 
(180215), on November 15th there was a suggestion that support against the 
China threat should be found amongst the neigbouring countries (181115). In this 
last statement the threat from China is even depicted as a disability facing Japan. 
Here, the threat that China is perceived to pose is already so inherent in the 
structure of the debates that the question no longer is whether or not there is a 
threat. Instead, there is the question of what to do about it. The “China threat” is 
here already treated as self-evident and thus is not questioned anymore. The 
understanding of China as such inherent to Japan as to constituting a disability is 
an excellent way of demonstrating how much China is a part of Japan and thus to 
prove one of our points of this thesis. 
5.2 Dependence 
When it comes to Japan’s place in the world, there seems to be much concern 
about the country’s possibility to occupy a seat in the United Nations Security 
Council. No less than six debaters have different suggestions on how to deal with 
this issue (161109, 170603, 170613, 170929, 171017, 180525) and what they all 
have in common, is the depiction of Japan depending on China in its aspiration to 
occupying a seat of its own. Other than that of the United Nations, the worsening 
of the relations to China is argued to affect Japan’s relations to Asia as a whole 
(160317) and thus to make Japan even more dependent on its western neighbour. 
Someone suggests that it is illogical to dispute with China given its influence on 
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North Korean matters (160323). North Korea is frequently depicted as the 
outmost foreign threat to Japan’s security and perceiving to be dependent on 
China on this issue I assume to be, to say the least, undesired. It is further 
suggested that Japan would end up alone in the region without China (161109). 
Again, this perception of dependency is shining through. Issues perceived as 
foreign to both Japan and China, such as the abduction issue (Japanese nationals 
abducted to North Korea is an issue yet to be resolved between the two countries), 
are suggested to be most favourably solved in concert (171017) with China. In 
this dimension of the narrative, there are more of the core identity features and 
less of the security practices at work than was the case in the threat case. Both the 
nationalist sentiments, identified as expressions of banal nationalism, and the 
routinisation processes are at work here as well and it is clear that Japan to a large 
extent build its location in relation to its perceived other. 
5.3 Shame 
Moving on to the third dimension of the Japanese narrative on China, the shame 
aspect, references to Hitler and Mussolini occur a couple of times (170203, 
170419). States, according to Huysmans (1998), are able to feel shame. No matter 
the definition of a collective feeling, I argue that it in the narrative are expressions 
of shame. Or, rather, there is a negotiation of whether Japan should feel ashamed. 
The guilt, that supposedly is causing this debate to occur, is presumably the 
question of war guilt that has been an ongoing controversy in Northeast Asia ever 
since the end of the Pacific War (the East Asian part of the Second World War). 
Less extreme statements suggest the government to be separated from the extreme 
right since the reason why this is not solved is that these two are equated with 
each other (171007). This statement is an illustration of the close connection 
between domestic and foreign policy that makes this dispute such difficult to 
solve. 
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6 Theoretical analysis 
Reconstructing a narrative provides insight into various phenomena. Taking the 
analysis yet a step further, by attaching theories to the reconstructed narrative, we 
are able to derive a theoretical framework for further analysis, applicable beyond 
this specific case. What this is about, is to putting together a theoretical 
framework aimed at explaining the three specific aspects of the Japanese 
narrative on China within the context of the Yasukuni controversy. Adding 
fragments of existing theories of identity, security, ontological security, 
routinisation and banal nationalism to these three cases, guarantees the empirical 
foundation of the framework in which the theories are put together; i.e. that the 
theory is indeed grounded in the empirical data. The composition of the 
compilation of theoretical fragments that is derived, is, by this, specific to the 
three aspects of the narrative from which it is derived. The essence of grounded 
theory, in accordance with my interpretation of it, is that the network derived then 
is to be applied onto different aspects or empirical settings in order to develop and 
eventually be turned into a theory. This process of applying it to different social 
phenomena takes place through reciprocal testing and revision in relation to the 
new empirical data analysed. This, though, is the subject of a different study. Here 
follows the compilation of the theoretical network. 
6.1 Compiling the network 
The concepts included in this compilation are: identity, security, ontological 
security, routinisation and banal nationalism. Adding the fragments one at a time, 
relating them to the data as well as to the ones previously added, different aspects 
of the data will be ascribed with different theoretical interpretations of meaning. 
First out is the concept of identity. 
6.1.1 Identity 
We shall under the heading of identity take the analysis a step further by referring 
to Arnett‘s definition of identity as located in the relation between subjectivity and 
social knowledge (Arnett 2002:777). Locating the unconscious mechanisms and 
depths of our every-day practices in the intersection between what we know about 
ourselves and the world around us, leads us to the unconscious processes in which 
we relate ourselves to our social world. The way in which this happens, according 
to Abdelal et al, is through the social interaction between these processes and the 
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meaning that we attach to them; the meaning through which our identities are 
negotiated in the unconscious processes between our subjectivities and our social 
knowledge. Meaning, defined as common ontological and epistemological ground 
as well as group norms (Abdelal et al 2006:695), is found in the settlement of 
what is Japanese and Chinese respectively. In this way, what is perceived as 
Japanese and Chinese vary between each individual that, in their capacity of 
being individuals, apply their own unconscious depths and mechanisms as well as 
their own subjectivity and social knowledge in their own individual processes. 
The Japanese and Chinese therefore are not fixed categories (and hence the italics 
throughout the thesis). They are dynamic processes that change over time, space 
and social context. 
6.1.2 Security 
Security, the third theoretical concept of this analysis, is here understood as the 
processes of making something seem dangerous; of producing a threat. Reading 
through the outline of the threat production in our case at hand, the motivation for 
including the dimension of security in the analysis is evident. The processes 
through which issues become security issues, according to Michael Williams, is 
essentially about how different referent objects become depicted as threats; or 
subjects of securitising practices. To unpack the security dimension of the 
Japanese narrative on China, the focus has to be on the change from depicting 
something as the “usual” to changing the depiction into becoming a “threat”. This 
requires an understanding of what is being secured and what it is threatened by. In 
this case this comes down to how the Japanese is being secured from what is 
perceived as a threat from China. What is perceived as being threatened, is the 
process of each individual relating to the shared identity that constitutes a 
common social “Japanese we”. Anything that is perceived as putting this “we” 
identity into jeopardy is likely to be turned into a threat (Williams 1998:435). 
6.1.3 Ontological security 
Adding identity and security onto each other, we arrive at the concept of 
ontological security, or security of the self. Ontological security is the aspiration 
to make the world ontologically secure, that is, to secure our sense of self in 
relation to the world. In order to do this, the perceptions, through our processes of 
negotiating ourselves in relation to our social world, are organised and categorised 
(Kinnvall 2004:746). It is through the processes of ontological security that Japan 
and China become what we in our daily usages of the terms perceive as fixed 
categories. Securing an ordered self and an ordered world involves defining 
elements to relate to as not belonging to the self (Campbell 1992:50). This is how 
Japan becomes what it is in relation to China. The security relation, making 
Japan ontologically secure, lays in the knowing (McSweeney 1999:13-15, 17f) of 
how to define, in this case, China, and this is how China, that ever since Kojiki, 
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the first printed matter in Japanese history, has been imagined as a significant 
other to Japan, becomes such an inherent part of a study on Japanese identity. 
6.1.4 The routinisation of security relations 
This routinisation of security relations may or may not be conflictual. Since also 
dangerous routines provide ontological security, Japan, that would be far better 
off without all these routinisations in its relationship to China, is attached also to 
the conflictual components of the antagonism. The aspect of ontological security-
seeking is, because of this, able to shed light on seemingly irrational elements of 
conflict (Mitzen 2006:364f); like those between Japan and China. This is 
precisely why this element of routinisation is so crucial for this study. In essence, 
China can not be separated from the Japanese and Japan; for its ontological 
security base, is thus attached to China being an inherent part of it. 
6.1.5 Banal nationalism 
Banal nationalism, states Billig, is so much a part of our daily practices that it is 
often unnoticed. Although not hidden, it is so deeply ingrained in the 
contemporary consciousness of our daily habits and routines that it is made 
obtrusive because of its very familiarity. The study of nationalism thus becomes 
the unpacking of this unconsciousness in the performance of our daily tasks. By 
noticing the subtle every-day signs of nationalism, we notice something about 
ourselves. Unpacking the mechanisms and depths of our daily doings equals 
discovering our own identity as it is embedded in our lives (Billig 1995:174-175). 
The above outline of the process in which the meaning-making practice takes 
place is an example of banal nationalism in many different respects. Firstly, it 
embodies the foundational characteristics of nationalism given that it contains 
depictions of the Japanese as well as the Chinese that are related to each other. 
Defining nationalism as the promotion of a certain national identity in relation to 
those of other nations, nationalist expressions are too easily found all throughout 
the text. Speaking about nationalism, one additional dynamic that I argue 
intensifies the polarisation, is the mobilisation based on popular sentiment taking 
place in both Japan and China. Adding this element of nationalism, that makes it 
different from identity, security, ontological security and routinisation, is this 
element of making a mass of people accelerate the processes at hand. 
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7 Summary and conclusions 
This is what a study with its methodological framework derived from grounded 
theory and narrative analysis on the Japanese narrative on China within the 
context of the Yasukuni controversy between 2001 to 2006 can look like. This is 
my version. Someone else would have done it differently. I have here given my 
account of how the Japanese can be seen as negotiated in relation to China within 
the context of the Yasukuni controversy between 2001 and 2006. 
7.1 Summary 
Historising the regionalism of Northeast Asia and discussing its implications for 
Sino-Japanese relations, the stage was set and the context defined. I further argued 
for the fusion of grounded theory and narrative analysis into a framework that I 
have called grounded narratology. Outlining their pros and cons as well as their 
compatibility, thhis methodological project became a part of the study. 
Empirically accounting for the Yasukuni controversy, chapter four then outlined 
this complicated matter, so crucial to Sino-Japanese relations. Discussing the 
identifications attached as well as the political significance of this controversy, the 
framework of the empirical analysis was outlined. Digging into the primary 
material, chapter five then reconstructed the three illuminating aspects of the 
“China threat”, “dependence” and “shame”. In chapter six followed the theoretical 
analysis of the reconstruction. Chapter six then proceeds with the theoretical 
analysis of the reconstruction. In chapter seven, the study is summed up and the 
conclusions are presented in chapter eight. Chapter nine provides and outline of 
the primary sources used in this study together with some comments of these. 
Chapter ten, finally, lists the  secondary sources. 
7.2 Conclusions 
Points that have been made throughout the course of this study are that the 
Japanese narrative on China on the empirical level is becoming increasingly 
polarised and routinised. Despite recent rhetorics of mutual cooperaton, the 
foundations underlying this relationship are, as they already are provoking mass 
mobilisation and public unrest, to be seen in a different light. Providing insight 
into an empirical material that has to this date – to the best of my knowledge – not 
been studied, and, moreover, due to language barriers, probably will not be such 
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frequently studied, this per se provides a contribution to the field of Japanese 
Studies. Further, stating that security can fruitfully be analysed through public 
narratives; that the road towards Aso’s declaring China a threat can be followed 
through this narrative. Falling outside the scpe of this study, or, rather, in order to 
provide some suggestions for further research, I argue that it would be interesting 
and potentially useful to, through the analysis of narratives, develop models for 
how to predict political changes in the world. Interpreting the political world as a 
myriad of related processes, outbursts of violence, depictions of foreign threat and 
the like are rather than being random, symptomatic of the every-day practices that 
we are all a part of. Developing the conceptual network of the theoretical 
fragments derived from the reconstruction of the narrative could, even if tiny, 
provide a new angle to the study of the constitution of national identities. 
Discovering how inherent the construction of China is to the construction of 
Japan, it is not far off to wonder what is the case of other national identities and, 
keeping the legible development of the narrative of the “China threat” in mind, I 
argue that this is an area worth digging into for the benefit of all of IR.  
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8 Primary sources 
This study is based on the primary sources of 284 contributions to Japanese Diet 
debates over the Yasukuni controversy between 2001 and 2006. These are readily 
available on the Japanese government’s homepage at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ by 
inserting “Yasukuni”, “China” and “2001 to 2006” into its search engine. Listed 
here are the ones that I explicitly refer to in the text. 
Having to decide how to account for the primary sources of this study, 
caused me a great deal of thought. My first impulse was to translate them all into 
English. On a second thought, though, I decided to keep them in the original 
language. The reason for this, is that the records are in Japanese and that, since 
many of the names of the individual meetings simply do not translate very well. 
Therefore, I thought that translating them into an English that would not quite 
make sense, and then for the reader to having spend quite an effort trying to find 
the proper record would not be very helpful. In order to maintain the transparency 
for non-Japanese speaking readers of this thesis, I have provided a translation 
besides keeping the original names. 
 
国際問題に関する調査
会 
Investigative meeting into international affairs 
本会議 Regular plenary session 
外務委員会 Foreign affairs committee 
外交防衛委員会 Diplomacy and self-defence committe 
予算委員会 Budget committe 
決算委員会 Accounting committe 
予算委員会公聴会 Budget committee (public hearing) 
沖縄及び北方問題に関
する特別委員会 
Special committee for Okinawa and the northern districts 
国際テロリズムの防止
及び我が国の協力支援
活動並びにイラク人道
復興支援活動等に関す
る特別委員会 
Special committe for Japan’s collaboration and support of 
Iraq as well as the prevention of international terrorism 
行政改革に関する特別
委員会 
Special committe for administrative reform 
憲法調査会 Commission on the constitution 
郵政民営化に関する特
別委員会 
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middle left column the name of the conference, the middle right column the 
number of the contribution and the far right column the date (stated in the fashion 
of year-month-day). Year 13 is in this case equivalent to 2001 and year 18 to 
2006. 
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